warned that failure to respect 504 cou ld result in loss of federal funds for the offending institution.
On March 7.1983 the Office of the Secretary of H HS issued an " Interim Fi nal Rule" wh ich ca me to be known as the" Ba by Doe Rule" ow ing to its perceived connection with the Bloomington "Infant Doe" case . The purpose of the" Rule" was to add to regulations implementing Section 504: (I) the protections afforded handicapped infants were to be brought to the attention of hea lth professionals and others who would be likel y to know of the occurrence of possible vio lations : (2) speedier in vestigation of alleged vio lations was provided for . since the requirement of a 10-day waiting period in the 1973 Act would often preclude action in time to save the lives of infants being discriminatorily withheld from treatment; and (3) round-the-clock access to hospital records to assure compliance was required.
Since the stated ultimate purpose of the "Interim Final Rule" was to sa ve the li ves of handicapped infants . and since the Secretary believed that those who had knowledge of violation of Section 504 might lack opportunit y to provide immediat e notice to federal officials. the "Ru le' required that a notice be posted in delivery. maternity. and pediatric wards giving the relevant information regarding Section 504 and declaring that "discriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped infant s in this facility is prohibited by federal law." The notice also was to list the number of what came to be called the "Baby Doe Hotline," a toll-free number open 24 hours a day where HHS could be reached by anyone "having knowledge that a handicapped infant is being discriminatorily denied food or customary medical care."
The "Interim Final Rule" took effect March 22, 1983 . It received wide attention and vehement criticism. particularly from the medical profession. Suit was brought in federal court to block implementation of the rule. and a stay was issued April 22. In response to t~e opposition from the medical profession , the Secretary issued, on July 5.1983. a new set of "Proposed Rules." Instead of setting a date on which the rules were to be implemented. the document merely specified that comments on the proposal be submitted by September 8. The "Proposed Rules," contained the major points of the "Interim Final Rule," but added the requirement that state child protective agencies be involved to assure greater compliance with state laws prohibiting child abuse and neglect.
On Jan. 12. 1984 , the Secretary of H HS issued its "Final Rule" to take effect Feb. 13. As a result of nearly 17,000 comments submitted in response to the "Proposed Rules." a few changes were made regarding the required notice and certain enforcement procedures. Also, greater attention was given to the possible usefulness of Infant Care Review Committees in developing appropriate standards and in making decisions about specific cases. But the fundamental principles embodied in the "Interim Final Rule" and the "Proposed Rules" remained unchanged. This paper exa min es th e H HS doc um en ts in o rd er to e x pli cate the Reagan administration's understanding of the re4uirements of just ice for the defective newborn. Although the guidelines ma y, in fact. be th e best means available for assuri ng that justice is done, it will be argued that the underlying eth ica l principlcs arc inade4uate in failing to take acco unt of morally re le vant conside rations that are defensible in justice and sanc ti o ned by t he C hu rch's offic ia l teachings.
What Justice Requires
This pape r assumes, w ith o ut argume nt. th a t newborns fall wit hin the scope of jus ti ce a nd th a t th e age ofa born hum an be in g is by itself no more m o ra ll y relevant than race, sex, IQ, or physical strength or beauty.2lfthis pos it ion be granted. then it ma y seem ob vious that a serious inju sti ce was done in Bloomington. T hi s paper argues for that view. But let us begin by co ns id c rin g how one might. w hile admitting th a t infa nts fa ll w ithin th e scope of justice, offe r o ne of two dcfenses for th e way Infant Doe was treated.
First. one cou ld appeal to what ma y be ca ll ed an "absolute 4ual it y-ofli fe" sta ndard , holding th at th ere are certain lives so low in 4uality that th e person wo uld be be tt e r offdead , and that one might be doing him an ac tual injustice b y a ll owing him to li ve ( i.e .. the asse rtion underl yin g "wrongful li fe" suits). T hen o ne would have to c laim th a t a person w ith Down's Synd rome meets whatever cond iti o ns t here a re for possess i ng s uc h a " negat ive 4uality o f life."
Set as id e th e objecti on that no co nfirmi ng tests were undertaken to ve rify the diagnosis of Down's sy ndro m e in the case of Baby Doe . Set a s id e. t oo, the po int th a t Down's syndrome displays considerable variation in it s ex press ion fr om severe re tardati on to bord erline normal. w ith the vas t majority falling in th e range of moderate retarda ti on. There rema in t wo genera l o bj ec ti o ns to s uc h an approach. , T he re is one serious objection w hich ca n be brought aga in st anI" absolut e 4ualit y-of-life standard: th e re is, in fa ct. no con se ns us a b ou t what makes a life not worth li vin g . Thejudgment th a t a give n indi vidua l's life is not wo rth li vin g is subjective a nd idiosyncratic in the extreme. It is a judgment that cou ld be called "ideo logica l" in ex press ing a particular conv ict ion regarding the meaning of human existe nce. What o ne person finds tolerab le another finds int o le ra ble. Seco nd , e mpirica l studies of indi viduals actu a ll y afnicted with Down's sy ndro me show that they do not share th e view th a t life w ith th at condition is no t worth living.
Thus, what appeals to an absolute quality-of-life standard comes to in thi s case is a position favo rin g the kil lin g of a no n-con se nting huma n being b y a second pe rso n usin g a 4u a lit y-of-life sta ndard the victim him se lf would be unlik e ly to sha re. If we examine what justice requires for a mom e nt from a Kantian pe rs pecti ve and if we were to conduct the thought ex pe riment of d es igning rules for a soc iet y in which we are to be born and li ve, we would ce rt a inl y no t a d o pt a rule pe rmitting such ki lling. The November, 1986 adoption of this rule will be seen to be even more unjustifiable when we reflect on the possibility that the person making such negative quality-oflife judgments for the helpless individual might be in the position of being required to care for him if he is not killed. For example. the parent who uses an absolute quality-of-life standard to judge his chi ld 's life not worth living is precisely the one who would incur the cost and other burdens of care if the child does not die. The possibilities for bias and gross abuse are manifest.
An alternative defense of t he Bloomington case would be to admit this serious moral objection to the use of any absolute quality-of-life standard. at least when it is imposed on someone who has not already expressed his views . Still, one could maintain that the objection is considerably lessened when appeal is made to a "relative quality-of-life" standard. The point of such a standard is simply to make explicit what we all recognize: that physical and mental normalcy is preferable to physical impairment of mental retardation, that it is better to walk on two legs than to get around in a wheelchair, better to have the mental capacity to read a book than not to have it. The reason why from a Kantian perspective the use of such a standard is not unjust is that it is one to which, within rough limits, we all can agree.
What follows from the use of a relative quality-of-life standard is the conviction that we benefit a person more by restoring him to normal health and functioning than if we leave him in a more or less seriously impaired condition. This must be distinguished from the view that we do the person no good at all. That would be a judgment expressive of an absolute quality-of-life standard. It is one thing to say that a mentally defective individual has a low quality of life. It is quite another to suggest that the individual's quality of life is zero or negative. For instance, using a relative quality-of-life standard , we would have to say about Karen Ann Quinlan that her quality of life was low and that we were doinll her relatively little good in keeping her alive . But, since Karen herself did not te ll us, we could not say that we were doing her absolutely no good at all. The issue here is not the truth of these judgments but the justice of acting on them when their acceptance by the party most involved is in doubt.
One Step to Complete Defense
Now there remains one more step to complete the second defense of the non-treatment of the Bloomington Baby. This is the principle that the help we are required to render in justice normally depends on four features: (I) the significance of the good that can reasonably be expected; (2) the degree of harm caused by the rendering of aid for the person being thus "aided";
(3) the degree of burden that must be assumed by those providing aid; and (4) the nature of the relationships among the parties. For instance , justice may require us to stop and render aid to someone involved in a serious accident , but we would not be required in justice to help him change a flat tire. A surgeon may be required to operate on a patient, but not if there is no anesthetic a va ilable. Although we ma y not ha ve a duty inju stice to save a strange r's life at the ri sk of our own, we might ha ve one if the only cost of d o ing so is th a t of being late for a n appointment. And we would bla me a pa rent who refuses to pay the cost of educating his child , though we would not blame a stranger for refusing.
Use of relative quality-of-life stand a rd also is sanctioned by authoritative Church teachings . Pope Pi us X II's famou s 1957 statement on the "Prolongation of Life" makes it clear that the Christian duty to preserve life depends on the context: But no rma lly o ne is held to use o nly ord ina ry mea ns -acco rdin g to circ umsta nces of perso ns. pl aces. t imes a nd c ulture -tha t is to say. mea ns th a t d o no t in vo lve a ny g rave burd en fo r o nese lf or a no th er. A more stri ct o bli gati o n wo uld be t oo burden so me for m os t me n a nd would re nde r th e att a inme nt o f the hig he r. more important go o d too diffic ult . Life. hea lth . a ll te mpora l acti vit ies a re in fac t sub o rdina ted to spiri tua l e nds'"
The idea of not being obliged to a ss ume a "gra ve burden" in prolonging life receives ex pansion in the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Fa ith's 1980 "Declaration on Euthanasia." Instead of employing the phrase " ordinary means" to refer to obligatory therapies, the "Declaration" focu ses on the distinction between "proportionate" a nd "disproportionate" means:
It will be poss ibl e to ma ke a co rrec t j ud g men t as to the mea ns by st ud ying th e type of trea tme nt used . it s degree of co mpl ex it y o r ri sk. its cost a nd th e poss ibi liti es o f using it . a nd co mpa ring these eleme nt s with the res ult t ha t ca n be ex pec ted . tak ing into acco unt th e sta te of th e sick pe rso n a nd hi s o r her ph ys ical a nd m o ral resources.
It is a lso permiss ible to ma ke do with the no rmal means that medicine ca n offer. The refo re o ne ca nn o t imp ose o n a nyone the obliga ti o n to have reco urse to a technique which is a lread y in use but which ca rries a ri sk o r is burdenso me . Such should be co nsid e red as a n acce ptan ce of the human co ndition . or a wi sh to avoid the a pplica tion o f a m edic a~ procedure di spro portion a te to th e result s th a t ca n be e x pected . o r a d es ire no t to impo se excessive ex pense on the famil y o r co mmunity· The language of "means that do not involve any grave burden for oneself or another" in the 1957 statement becomes "a medical procedure disproportionate to the results that can be expected" in the 1980 document. But three points seem clear in both statements: (I) that decisions regarding the obligatoriness of certain treatments are contextdependent; (2) that the burdens imposed on others of providing treatment may legitimately be taken into consideration; and (3) that the degree of expected benefit to the patient is another morally relevant consideration . The Church's official teaching is perfectly consistent with secular notions of justice in this regard.
Thus , on both secular theories of justice and historical Catholic principles, the obligation one has to preserve another's life is relative to a proportion between the benefits expected and the burdens imposed . And if appeal to proportional benefit can indeed be justified, then a defense of letting Infant Doe die could be offered as follows. A rejection of an absolute 4uality of life standard prevents us from saying that we harm Infant Doe by letting him li ve. But we can say that we will do him less good by preserving his life than by preserving the life of a completely normal child. If we join with th is the point that caring for a child with Down's synd ro me ca n be pa rt ieula rly onerous bot h for pa rents a nd society, we ca n see how one might claim that the ratio of benefit to cost is too low to ma ndate treatment. Society clea rly has no obligation to spend $ I 0,000,000 to restore a human being to normal functioning. Nor do we as a society have the responsibility to expend the effort necessary to raise a child with Down's syndrome.
It bears noting that this argument about what is required injustice is not necessarily utilitarian. It is not even necessarily consequentialist. if that term be taken to refer to the thesis that consequences alone matter. This argument does not maintain that allowing the child to die is justified because overall social utility will be thereby maximized. Nor is it argued that the benefit to society is too small to justify the expenditures. Rather, the claim is that the expected benefit to the child himself is too small relative to the cost to require treatment. I f one rejects the propriety of this line of reasoning, it will be difficult if not impossible to escape the conclus ion that just ice does indeed require the spend ing of $1 0,000,000 to save a life .
The major defect with the argument in this case is not its form or the moral relevance of the considerations it advances, but s impl y the pIa usibility of its principal premise, that the expected benefit to the child is too low. given the burden of care, to require treatment. Caring for a child with Down's syndrome is no doubt more difficult than for the average ch ild, but how many physically and mentally normal children for a number of reasons impose a burden on their parents and society equal to or greater than that posed by children with Down's syndrome? And as for benefit. individ uals with Down's syndrome seem to value their own li ves as much as normal people value theirs.
I f it be 0 bjected t ha t such i nd ivid uals a re mentally too deficient to make correct judgments in this area, we might well ask how that assertion could be defended. And we might note the many serious ly physically handicapped persons who find great value in their lives. A Christia n will recognize the defective child as the object of God's enduring love. And even from a secu lar viewpoint, a spirit of tolerance, while recognizing the desirability of physical and mental normalcy, will not be quick to denigrate the goodness of persons' lives, especially when their possessors find them good. And finally, from a Kantian perspective, it simply does not appear credible that an individual who sets aside his own idiosyncratic va lues should choose for a society in whic h he was to be born and live, a policy that would a ll ow infants with Down's syndrome to die at the wishes of their parents. An adu lt with a full formed set of idiosyncratic values might very well honestly say, "If I were an infant with Down's syndrome I would not want to li ve ." but justice cannot permit th e imposition of s uch va lues o n ano ther person.
The " Bab y Doe" Guidelines: What Justice Does Not Require
The la nguage of a ll the H H S documents is the la ng uage of nond iscrimin a ti o n. The "Proposed Rules" are filled w ith s uch refere nces. For ins ta nce. there is niention of the need for "exped iti ous investigation a nd immedi a te e nfo rceme nt ac ti o n when necessary to protect a ha ndi ca pped infant w ho se life is endange red b y discrimination."5 Th e d oc u m e nt decla res tha t th e "d isc ri m i na tory fa i I ure of hea It h ca re providers to feed a handi cap ped infant or to provide m edica l treatmen t esse ntial t o co rrec t a life-threa tening co nditi o n" is a vio la ti o n o f Section 504 o f the Rehabilitation Act w hi ch "requires that hea lth se rvices be prov ided to the ha ndicap ped o n a bas is o f equalit y with th ose not ha ndi ca pped' ".
T he ke y to th e R eaga n ad mini strat ion's pos iti o n a nd a n indicat io n of whe re it s weak ness li es ca n be found in this paragraph : Section 504 is in essence al1 clJual treatment. nondiscr imin ation st"l ndard .
Congress patterned Section 504 on T itle V I of th e C i"il Right s Aet. ,,"hi eh prohibits discrimination based on ra ce. Programs or activities rece iving fede ra l fina ncial ass ista nce ma y not deny a hCl1cfil o r sen'icc so lely o n grounds of a r c rso n's handi cap.ju st as t hey ma y not deny a hCJ1cfit or se n "icc O il grou nd s o f a person's race, l, This a na logy betwee n the handi cap pe d pe rso n a nd th e pe rs on discriminated against on th e basi s of ra ce is revealing . If we think racial di scrim inati o n wrong. it is because we assume e ith e r (I) that the service be ing denied members of th e di sfavored race would be a t leas t ro ughl y as be neficia l to them as it is to th e perso ns rece iving th e service o r (2) that the re ex ists a n alternative se rv ice which would be as va luabl e. And we also think thi s discriminatory be ha v io r wro ng partl y beca use it results fr o m a spirit of hat e or ca llou s indiffere nce towards the di s fav~'e d race rather tha n for so m e m o ra ll y defensible reaso n. The co ntention that a se rvice d e nied members of one race wo uld not ben efi t th e m and ca nn o t be substituted fo r b y an a ltern a ti ve service wo uld . if true . be a n effective res ponse t o an y charge of racia l di scriminat io n. Thus . if a n analogy between racial discrimination and the w ithh o lding of ca re for han d ica pped infants is to be s usta ined . it will need to be s hown (I) that the re exists at least so m e be neficia l se rvice being d e ni ed ha ndica pped infants and (2) that d e nial of the se rvice has no mora ll y defensible ex pla nati o n.
The hi story of judicia I int er preta tion of Secti o n 504 s hows a n awa reness of the first point. That sec tion contained refe re nce to an "o th e rwis e qu a lifi ed ha ndica pped indi vidua l" without a n ex pl a nat ion of th e s ig nifica nce o f the phrase "otherwise qualified." A 1979 S upre m e Co urt d ecis ion cla rifi ed thi s lang ua ge by d ecla rin g s uch a perso n to be o ne capable of be nefitting. in spite of his ha ndica p. from the prog ram offered .
The iss ue. the n . as Section 504 is a ppli ed to th e care of ha ndicap ped infants. is which infants are "otherwise qualified." i.e .. are capable of benefitting from the services being offered to others. but denied the m .
The position of the Reagan administration on this point is clear. The "Final Rule" states:
In the co nt ext of recei"ing medical care. the ahility to henefit for a handicapped person is the ahility to hencfit medically from the treatment or sen'ices. If thc handicapped person is ahlc to hencfit medi ca ll y from the t rea t me nt or sen'ice. in s pite of t he person's presc nt or ant ici pol ted p hysica I or men tal impairments. the indi,'idua l is "otherwi se qualified " to rcce iyc that treatment or sen'ice. and it may not he denicd solely on the has is of the handicap .
Th e refore. the analytical framc\\'ork undcr the sta tutc for applying sect ion S04 in the con tc xt of health care for handicapped infants is that health ca re prm'idcrs may not. solei,' on the hasis of prese nt or anticipated physical or mental impairme nts of an infant. withhold trea tment or nourishment from the in fant who. in s pit c of such impairments. will medically hcncfit from the treatment o r nouri shmcnt. 7
This does not mean. though . that handicapped infants must be given all treatments that would ordinarily be provided normal children:
These interpretati ve guidelines make clear that futile treatments or treatmcnts that will do no more than temporaril y prolong the act of dying of a terminally ill infant are not required hy sec tion S04. and that. in determining w hether certain possihle trea tments will he medicall y he neficial to an infant. reasonahle medical judgments in selecting a mong alternative courses of treatment will he respected .'
Although it would be permissible. for example. not to engage in surgery to prolong the life of an anencephalic infant who will die soon. whatever is done. treatment may not be withheld because of cost ("cost should not be a determinative factor in deciding upon treatment for seriously impaired newborns")9 or because of the burden of care imposed on the family ("excluding consideration of the negative effects of an impaired child's life on other persons' ").10 , Now there is much that is right with the position of the Reagan administration. I n spite of some self-serving statements from the medical profession. there does exist a significant bias against handicapped infants which renders them victims of unjust undertreatment. It is possible to disagree about the frequency of such occurrence. But how many of those who contend that the prob lem is minor would be content with the remark that political oppression in America n society constitutes a minor problem beca use there are so few genuinely political prisoners in our jails? The very legitimacy of the American system rests upon its concern for justice/or al/.
And although there are limits to what any human institution can be expected to accomplish, we cannot afford to take lightly any institutional injustice -injustice which is perpetrated through our institutions rather than in spite of them.
But there is a weakness, too, in the Administration's position, one suggested by the analogy drawn with racial injustice. We assume that providing second-rate schools for blacks is wrong because we believe not only that they could benefit from better schools but also that not providing better schools results from racist attitudes. In other words . we oppose second-rate schools for blacks as unjust because we think that there is no morally defensible reason for not providing better ones.
The Reagan administration's position comes close to the suggestion that there is 110 morally defensible reason for withholding from the handicapped infant medically beneficial treatment which would ordinarily be given to the normal child. But it would seem that the assumption ought to be that whatever considerations are deemed legitimate within a general theory of justice arc also defensible IIll/talis II/walldis when dealing with the care of infants. defective or normal. Consider once again the four reasons cited above with possible applications to pediatric medicine: (I) no benefit at all can reasonably be expected from the proposed therapy (e.g., the infant will die soon whateve r is done) : (2) the benefit is too low to justify the harm done (e.g .. a Tay-Saehs child requires cardiac surgery): (3) the cost of rendering aid is too heavy to require its imposition (e.g .. the child needs a liver transplant in order to live): and (4) the relationship among the parties does not impose a given duty (e.g .. an overworked surgeon refuses to perform an operation on an infant not his patient) . These arc legitimate considerations within a general theory of justice, and though they no doubt create special problems in the practice of pediatric medicine . this is no reason for thinking them inappropriate or unjust. Surely the burdcn or proor ought to be on those who admit the general moral rclevanec ' of these considerations but deny their acceptability in determining the ethically mandated care or the defective child.
It may be objected that no one is upset over decisions not to engage in cardiac surgery for a child with Tay-Saehs or not to seek a liver transplant ror an anenccphalie infant. What is bothersome because unjust, are decisions likc thc one in Bloomington. to withhold simple surgery for children with Down's syndrome. But ir one examines the cases which act ually generate the greatest moral uncertainty as opposed to controversy (egregiously wrongful acts are orten highly controversial), one rinds that such cases are not instances of withholding food and fluids from children with Down's syndrome. The cases which create the most moral uncertainty are precisely ones in which there exist general moral considerations favoring discontinuance of treatment. but for which the H HS guidelines would seem to mandate continued therapy.
A Case
To illustrate the point that the Reagan administration's requirements may conflict with general considerations of justice, consider the following true case. one which is unfortunately not atypical.
An infant (let us call him Robert) was admitted to a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) shortly after birth. He weighed 960 gramsat birth, with a heart rate. respiration . and blood pressure of zero and a body temperature November, 1986 of 93 degrees. He was diagnosed as ha ving perinatal asphyxia for an undetermined length of time. Robert has been at the N I CU for more than three months . During that time he has experienced recurrent periods of slow heartbeat (bradycardia) and loss of spontaneous breathing (apnea). He has been placed on and taken off a respirator severa l times. Robert ha s a bulging fontanelle and was diagnosed as hav ing had an intracranial hemorrhage . A CT-scan and an EEG have revealed some abnormalities. Robert neither sucks nor swallows. I n the middle of the fourth month after birth , a neurological examination shows probability of "significa nt neurological involvement." The best the neurologist is willing to haza rd for Robert is that he will be of low normal intelligence. The child has had seizures and was placed on phenobarbital until it was discontinued when the doses became toxic. Use of the respirator has damaged the child's lungs, and there is some fear that continued use of the tube through which he is fed will cause constriction of the trachea. Robert has contractures which make a neurological examination difficult. He has developed scurvy and rickets. The neurological examination suggested that the child might grow out of his apnea and bradycardia. The seizures appear likely to continue but may be partially controllable. None of the attending professionals believe Robert is dying, though his overall prognosis is "very poor." His mother seems willing to take Robert into her home, but she is young and unmarried a nd lives with her mother in a house with no running water, phone or electricity. A phone is available at the home of relatives, about one mile away. They have a car, but it is unreliable. The social worker on Robert's case doubts whether the mother will be able to provide the medical care that would become necessary in an emergency.
The H HS guidelines maintain it to be a violation of Section 504 for a recipient of federal funds to withho ld from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance or medical or surgical treatment required to correct a life-threate ning co nliition if:
(I) the withholding is based on the fact that th e infant is handicapped ; and (2) the handicap does not render the treatment or nutritional sustenance medicall y co ntraindicated. "
If Robert develops apnea while he is off the respirator, should we place him back on? Do we have a legal or moral duty to do so?
We may begin to answer these questions by examining them from the point of view of the Reagan administration. We would first need to know whether Robert counts as an "otherwise qualified handicapped infant." It would be most implausible to suggest that he does not. Robert is not dying, though the respirator is occasionally necessary to prolong his life. The fact that Robert only occasionally needs respiratory support indicates that his lungs are not irreversibly damaged. He may grow out of his periods of apnea and bradycardia. Is use of the respirator "medically contraindicated"? No. It is true that the respirator may have impaired Robert's lungs, but this is common and recovery is quite possible. The alternative to use of a respirator now is a quick death by asphyxiation. If we were to decide not to resuscitate Robert should he once again develop apnea , would this be based on the fact that Robert is handicapped? [t must be. Use of the respirator is standard practice in N[CU's. Only his poor prognosis for mental normalcy and the difficulties his care is likely to encounter at home, not any terminal illness , explain why anyone would think twice about withholding treatment. Thus, it appears inescapable that, according to the Reagan adm ini stration guidelines, not returning Robert to the respirator would be a violation of Section 504.
Bu are we morally obliged to re-institute respirator therapy? A case can be made for a negative answer, one consistent with Church teaching. First of all, we need not and should not maintain that Robert's life is not worth living. We would simply say that we had already done enough for Robert, more than could be demanded by justice. The prospect for significant benefit to Robert is slim. The burdens already assumed by the provision of care are large, to say nothing of the suffering to which we have subjected Robert. The ratio of expected benefit (Robert's) to cost (both for Robert and others) is too small for treatment to be required in justice. To deny legitimacy of considering the proportion of burdens to expected benefits in the care of defective newborns would be (I) to assign them a special status possessed by no other human being and (2) at the same time to subject them to the danger of requiring painful therapies no matter how poor the prognosis.
Without suggesting that the Church's principles require the nontreatment of Robert, we may still insist that nothing in the Church's position requires treatment , either. As Pope Pius remarked , life and all temporal activities are subordinated to spiritual ends. We owe Robert, as we own any helpless person , the type of care we would think obligatory in our own case. But since we have no duty to impose excessive burdens on ourselves or others to preserve our own life, there are limits to what can in justice be imposed on us for the care of others. , The Reagan administration has acted to remedy a serious injustice occurring in the care of the most helpless among us. Reasonable people may well disagree on the best way of seeing that justice be done. This paper has not been concerned to evaluate the workability of the guidelines, but to examine the defensibility of the underlying principles. It may very well be the case that in order to assure that injustices like the one in Bloomingon not occur, the procedures to be implemented must exclude relative qualityof-life assessments or consideration of the burden of care for family and society. But even if this were true, it is a suggestion that needs argument and should not be assumed at the outset. Also , it is one thing to say that certain morally acceptable principles cannot be applied in a given context because of their unworkability or danger of abuse. It is quite another to maintain that those principles are themselves improper and that appeal to them displays a poor sense of justice. This paper has been concerned to show simply that considerations excluded by the HHS documents are defensible within a general theory of justice and are consistent with Church teaching. The wisdom of their employment within the context of perinatal medicine ha s not been addressed here.
